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Abstract:
This paper uses hypothetical contractarianism to consider the value of children’s rights
laws as a means of protecting children. Laws protecting children from their parents
have the unintended but predictable consequence of making child-rearing less desirable
for some parents and thereby reducing the number of children born. Such laws therefore
produce a trade-off between the expected wellbeing of actual and possible persons. I show
that a possible child behind an appropriate veil of ignorance may rationally oppose laws
which beneﬁt some and harm no actual children.
Keywords: Contractarianism; axiological possibilism; normative population theory; chil-
dren’s rights.
1. Introduction
Parents have a great deal of power over their children, and this fact poses serious
problems for liberal political theory and public policy in liberal democracies. Par-
ents are given fairly wide scope to raise their children as they see ﬁt, but liberal
states routinely place limits on parental sovereignty in the name of children’s
rights (Archard 2004). In many cases, concern for the welfare and autonomy
of children conﬂicts with the values of non-liberal cultural groups. Christian
scientists refusing life-saving medical treatment for their children (Hickey and
Lyckholm 2004), Old Order Amish refusing to educate their children beyond the
eighth grade (Mazie 2005), and Islamic cultures engaging in female circumci-
sion (Nussbaum 1999, chap. 4) are examples of this conﬂict. In each of these
cases, parents’ religious beliefs are at odds with broadly-held liberal views of
how children should be treated, and debate has centered on the tension between
tolerance and autonomy (Galston 1995).
In a nonideal world, the appropriate distribution of rights depends not only
on moral considerations narrowly construed, but also on the normatively-rele-
vant second-order effects of such distributions.1 This paper considers one such
second-order effect of laws which restrict parental authority: reduced fertility.
1 On feasibility see Brennan and Hamlin (2009) and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012). On non-
ideal theory see Schmidtz (2011). On feasibility in the context of children’s rights law, though of a
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Parents not only decide how to treat their children, but also whether to have
those children at all. These choices are not independent, and this complicates
liberal justiﬁcations for children’s rights laws. Parents—especially those belong-
ing to illiberal cultural groups—have strong preferences over how their children
are raised. Rational choice theories of fertility suggest that limiting parental
sovereignty makes some parents less willing to have children. If children raised
in illiberal communities have lives worth living and additional worthwhile lives
are considered valuable, this is something liberal theorists and policymakers
ought to consider.
Contractarianism provides a means of impartially considering the conﬂict-
ing interests of many individuals. By asking what rational individuals would
choose under epistemically and motivationally idealized conditions, contractar-
ianism provides a simulation of impartial moral judgment beginning from indi-
vidual self-interest (Buchanan and Lomasky 1984; Harsanyi 1953; 1955; 1978;
Narveson 2013; Rawls 1971). This paper adopts a version of hypothetical con-
tractarianism which considers the hypothetical choice of a rational possible per-
son behind a veil of ignorance. Following Harsanyi (1953; 1955; 1978) I assume
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and assume that hypothetical con-
tractors have perfect knowledge of how alternative options inﬂuence the welfare
of individuals but complete uncertainty as to which individual they will be. Fol-
lowing Kavka (1975) I include possible persons whose existence depends on the
choice at hand in the original position.
This approach allows us to consider the hypothetical exit behavior of those
children who in reality have neither exit options nor voice. A hypothetical pos-
sible child considering whether to support legislation designed to protect them
from their parents will be inﬂuenced not simply by the value of such protec-
tions given that they do exist, but also the effect on their likelihood of being
actualized. Such a perspective reveals that children’s rights legislation, even if
perfectly effective in making actual children better off, can be seen as bad for
children in an abstract but normatively powerful sense.
I consider only the interests of potential children and ignore the preferences
of parents. Though parents no doubt have moral standing here, I do this in
order to focus on the central claim by children’s rights advocates which I wish
to question: that protective laws are good for children. In questioning this claim
I make an argument which applies a fortiori to more comprehensive axiological
analyses which consider the interests of parents as well as children.
While the argument here is strictly axiological and does not preclude overrid-
ing deontological considerations, I suggest that the previously neglected costs of
children’s rights I identify here are normatively relevant—i.e. they ought to be
given some consideration in policy debates over the appropriate level of parental
sovereignty. Such debates might reasonably conclude that the beneﬁts of some
piece of children’s rights law outweigh the costs or that there are deontological
considerations which trump the interests of possible persons. My point is simply
to show that some children’s rights protections are less desirable than we would
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signiﬁcance of possible persons and the appropriateness of contractarianism for
the question at hand as assumptions of this paper. Although I ﬁnd each of these
assumptions reasonable and will have a few words to say in their support, I do
not offer a rigorous defense of either proposition, since this would take far more
space than is available here.2
2. Axiological Possibilism
Whenever we make a choice at time t among n meaningful and feasible options,
we are destined to bring about one of n possible worlds at time t+1.3 The out-
come of some choices will affect the identity and number of persons who come
to exist. If a person’s existence depends on our choice we may call them a con-
tingent person. A contingent person is one who exists in one or more, but not
all, possible worlds. That is, a normal person whose existence is contingent
rather than some invisible ghostly entity whose personhood is contingent. Af-
ter our choice has been made and the consequences played out, some of these
contingent persons will have been actualized. An actual person is one who ex-
ists in this (i.e. ‘the real’) world; a nonactual possible person is one who could
have existed but does not. A necessary person is one who exists in all possible
worlds, and along with contingent persons they form the group of possible per-
sons. While the language of possible persons and possible worlds is sometimes
interpreted as requiring strong and counterintuitive metaphysical assumptions,
I here use these concepts simply as a means of counterfactual reasoning (Broome
2004, 14–15; Holtug 2001, 366–379).
Ordinary ethical behavior requires that we ignore the interests of nonactual
persons—there is little point in making tea for a person who might have existed
but does not, and they do not mind when we step on their hypothetical toes.
When we make a choice which affects the number and identity of those who will
come to exist, on the other hand, the distinction between actual and nonactual
persons cannot in principle be made. At t there is simply no fact of the matter as
to who exists at t+1, since the answer is contingent on the choice we make now.
Facing this open future, impartiality requires that we consider the interests of
all parties affected by our choice.
Many axiological systems subscribe to the person-affecting restriction, which
holds that states of affairs can only be good or bad (or better or worse) insofar
as they are good or bad for one or more individuals. A person whose existence
depends on our choice is in an obvious intuitive sense affected by it, though
2 On axiological possibilism, see Hare (2007) and Holtug (2001; 1999; 2012, chap. 5). On contrac-
tarianism in general see Narveson (2013). On contractarianism with possible persons, see Kavka
(1975).
3 Of course, we cannot know precisely how our actions will play out and the choices of others will
interact with others in bringing about the actual world. I here ignore such complications by
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many insist that a welfare comparison of existence and non-existence is mean-
ingless. When I consider whether to kick actual Alice in the shin, I am making
a cross-world welfare comparison. If I choose to kick her, a possible world in
which she has a sore shin, and perhaps a general sense of distrust, becomes ac-
tual. If I choose to contain my violent tendencies, an alternative possible world
in which Alice remains pain-free and trusting is actualized. Most reasonable
person-affecting axiologies will have no problem recognizing that Alice is bet-
ter off in the latter possible world—since her mental states are more pleasant,
her preferences more satisﬁed, or her basic interests better advanced—and no
especial logical difﬁculties arise.
When I make a choice which determines whether some possible future person
exists, however, it is no longer so obvious that cross-world welfare comparisons
make sense. If a person does not exist, they have no actual preferences, experi-
ences, or interests. When asked to value non-existence against lives containing
a mix of joy and frustration, one obvious response is to assign good things a pos-
itive value, bad things a negative value, and non-existence the neutral value of
zero. Some have disputed the validity of this approach. Heyd claims that ‘there
is no way to compare the amount of suffering of states of actual people and the
state of non-existence of these people. We should resist the temptation of assign-
ing a zero-value to non-existence, thus making it quantitatively commensurable
with either the positive or the negative net value of the lives of actual people’
(Heyd 1992, 113). Non-existent lives clearly have no value, but the claim that
they have zero value is to inappropriately assign a deﬁnite value to something
which cannot be evaluated, since there is no standard of evaluation without
preferences or interests.
As Holtug (2001, 364–383) shows, a response to the claim that non-existence
cannot be evaluated without preferences or interests in the relevant world will
depend somewhat on the axiological position adopted. If we hold an objective
list or hedonic view of (person-affecting) value, there is no logical problem. Even
if outcomes can only be evaluated insofar as they affect persons, the standard of
evaluation (happiness, ﬂourishing, etc.) is independent of any person’s prefer-
ence. That there is nobody to long for our existence in worlds from which we are
absent presents no particular logical problem compared to ontological counter-
factual statements. Similarly, if we take an object version of preferentialism—
that individual preferences give external states of affairs such as pleasant men-
tal states inherent value—we can similarly take a person’s preference in a world
in which they do exist as a standard of evaluation for worlds in which they
do not. Heyd’s objection is most plausible when interpreted on a preference-
satisfaction theory of value. On this account, it is the coincidence of some pre-
ferred state of affairs and a preference regarding that state of affairs which
creates value. So, in a world where Bob does not exist, the claim that existence
would be good for Bob is parsed as ‘Bob prefers that he would have existed, but
that preference is not satisﬁed’. This clearly makes no sense, since there is no
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This interpretation of preference satisfaction is, I think, a mistaken one. We
need not claim there is a preference in a world which remains unsatisﬁed to
say that there is zero preference satisfaction in that world in a comparatively
meaningful sense. We have an absence of a good thing, which is neutral. If in
a world in which Bob exists and has a surplus of preference satisfactions, there
is more preference satisfaction in this world than another world in which Bob
does not exist, despite Bob having no preferences in the latter. A world in which
a person has good things is better for that person than a world in which they
do not, whether they are there to realize it or not. Only a preference-frustration
account of value seems capable of grounding Heyd’s objection. This is not only
implausible, but also inconsistent with Heyd’s general argument insofar as it
implies that bringing a person into existence is practically always a bad thing,
since everybody can expect some of their preferences to be frustrated (Holtug
2001, 380–383).4
When we claim that a possible future person Bob would be beneﬁtted (or
harmed) by existence, we are claiming that it is better (or worse) for him that
he exist than not. We need not assign any intrinsic value to life itself here.
Rather, existence beneﬁts a person insofar as it allows good things to accrue to
them. Thus, existence beneﬁts a person who thereafter lives a life worth living
all things considered. By ‘lives worth living’ I mean lives in which good things
outweigh bad things in the relevant sense, with worthiness deﬁned by whatever
axiology one holds (Parﬁt 1984, 257–258). The extent of the beneﬁt or harm of
existence depends on the balance of good or bad things.
Though the argument of this paper does not depend on the claim that non-
existence has precisely zero value to a person, I do require that it is quanti-
tatively commensurable with existence at various levels of welfare. Accepting
non-existence as a natural zero point would allow us to construct a ratio scale of
welfare. This is not necessary for our purposes, since we are interested in com-
paring only the difference in utility across possible worlds. The interval scale of
Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility is therefore sufﬁcient. We can arbitrarily as-
sign non-existence the baseline value of zero, some possible life worth living the
arbitrary value of one, and deﬁne the utility of other possible lives in terms of
preference between uncertain prospects. If we set option x at zero and y at one,
an individual indifferent between y with certainty and x or z with equal proba-
bility reveals herself to value z at 2 units of utility (Alchian 1953; Von Neumann
and Morgenstern 1964). In this paper I will treat non-existence as having zero
value, but it should be noted that this number has meaning only in comparison
with the utility of other possible lives.
A possible person’s wellbeing is determined by the sum of positive and neg-
ative utilities accruing to them throughout their existence. A nonactual person,
of course, does not exist at all and thus accrues no positive or negative utilities—
their welfare is zero in the very simple sense that nothing good or bad can hap-
pen to them. An actual person living a miserable life will have negative net
4 It should be noted that some, most notably Benatar (2006), are willing to bite this bullet and claim
that bringing people into existence is always blameworthy.98 Brad R. Taylor
utility and would be better off not having existed (i.e. is harmed by existence),
while an actual person living a happy life will have positive net utility and would
be worse off not having existed (i.e. is beneﬁtted by existence). It makes no prac-
tical sense to claim that a nonactual person has been harmed or beneﬁtted by
non-existence once the actual persons have been sorted from the nonactual, but
there is nothing logically incoherent about such a claim when we consider ben-
eﬁts and harms as betterness relations between the relevant alternatives and
assign non-existence the neutral welfare value of zero (Holtug 2001, 370–377).
Moreover, such judgments are an essential component of practical hypothetical
reasoning conducted before the relevant choice is made, since no distinction can
be made between actual and nonactual persons at this point. When our choice
determines which possible persons will become actual, there is no obvious basis
for privileging one set of possible persons over another.
Axiologies which insist that only actual persons matter morally cannot guide
action in a practical sense when the actualized population of persons is at stake.
The alternative I adopt in this paper is to extend moral status to all possible
persons, though there are other possibilities which it is worth brieﬂy consider-
ing to see how axiological possibilism stacks up.5 Although the idea that only
actual people matter is intuitively appealing, many seem to have a stronger
intuitive commitment to what McMahan (1981; 2009) calls “the asymmetry”.
Many want to claim that (1) we have moral reason not to bring about miserable
lives (i.e. lives not worth living), and (2) we have no moral reason to bring about
happy lives (i.e. lives worth living). McMahan recognizes the intuitive appeal of
these propositions but argues that they are difﬁcult to maintain while holding
a consistent version of the person-affecting restriction and retaining an action-
guiding approach to moral theory. The claim that it is bad to bring a predictably
miserable individual into existence requires that we admit impersonal or non-
comparative value as normatively-relevant, while the claim that it is not good
(or bad) to bring a predictably happy individual into existence is premised on the
idea that impersonal and non-comparative value is non-existent or normatively-
irrelevant. Treating costs and beneﬁts asymmetrically does not solve this prob-
lem, since the desirable aspects of a normal happy life are required to ‘cancel’
the undesirable aspects and avoid the conclusion that it is bad to create any life
which has any undesirable aspect. If we cannot distinguish between the gain
of being born into a happy life and the loss of being born into a miserable one,
a possible response is to reluctantly accept that the former is praiseworthy in
order to say that the latter is blameworthy (Broome 2004; 2005; Singer 1993,
103–105).
5 There are further possibilities I do not consider here, but as has been adequately established else-
where these positions produce highly counterintuitive and sometimes inconsistent conclusions.
Hare (2007) and Roberts (2010, 60–69) show that ‘actualist’ approaches are unable to guide ac-
tion, and Broome (2005) shows that acceptance of the claim that adding new and happy lives is
morally neutral is inconsistent with the Pareto principle. The symposium on ‘possible preferences’
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Roberts (2010; 2011) attempts to resolve the apparent contradiction of the
asymmetry by arguing that although all possible persons matter morally and
are capable of suffering loss, only losses which are suffered in worlds in which
individuals exist are morally signiﬁcant. All possible persons matter, but they
matter variably depending on the modal relationship between harm and exis-
tence. Loss is here deﬁned in terms of a comparative betterness relation: ‘to say
that a person p incurs a loss at a given world w as a result of a given act a is to
say that there was still another world w´ accessible to agents at the critical time
such that their performance of an alternate act a´ at w´ is better for p than their
performance of a at w is’ (Roberts 2011, 337). Since Roberts accepts, as do I, that
the non-existence can meaningfully be compared against happy or unhappy lives
in terms of welfare, she ﬁnds claims such as ‘Alice was beneﬁtted by being born
into a happy life’ and ‘Bob was harmed by being born into a miserable life’ quite
coherent. However, by restricting her normative attention to losses and claim-
ing that losses are only morally relevant when incurred in worlds in which the
individual exists, she is able to treat Alice’s beneﬁt as morally neutral and Bob’s
harm as morally bad. Alice would have suffered a loss had she not come into
existence, but since she fails to exist in the world where such a loss is incurred
this loss does not matter. Bob’s loss occurs in a world in which he does exist,
however, and this means that his suffering has full moral status even though he
does not exist in the world which is better for him.
Roberts’s variabilist account is, it seems to me, by far the most plausible way
of grounding the asymmetry. I grant that she has established the conclusion
that ‘Variabilism nicely grounds both halves of the Asymmetry and avoids the
consistency and other conceptual problems that plague its competitors’ (Roberts
2011, 336). But this is not an argument for variabilism over possibilism unless
we feel compelled to endorse the asymmetry. The motivation for the symmetry, it
seems, is simple intuition. When Roberts does attempt to argue for variabilism
over possibilism, the brute nature of her belief that making happy people must
be morally neutral is clear:
“The one distinction that Inclusion [i.e. possibilism] insists we set
aside is always going to seem to us one that no sound moral analysis
can conceivably set aside: that one act imposes a loss on a real, live,
ﬂesh and blood, sentient being and the other a loss on, well, nothing
that does or will ever exist at all. There just is an important moral
distinction to be made between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making
happy people’. In a way that can only be described as axiomatic,
your actual dog must come before your merely possible cat.” (Roberts
2010, 45, emphasis in original)
According to Roberts (2010, 75), the fact that inclusivism provides answers to
moral problems involving possible persons we ﬁnd counterintuitive shows that
it ‘is surely false’. This clearly begs the question. While Roberts shows that
it is possible to sharpen the intuition behind the asymmetry in order to avoid
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variabilism over possibilism. In response, I have nothing to say to Roberts other
than ‘I don’t share your intuitions on this matter’. Although I share the view
that a moral obligation to make happy people whenever possible would be quite
unreasonable, it does seem to me intuitively that making happy people is su-
pererogatory. I am happy to have been born, and, intuitively, this happiness
should count as a point in favor of my parents’ decision to bring me into the
world. Since carrying and raising an unwanted child would be severely burden-
some we generally do not consider voluntarily childlessness blameworthy (or
abortion impermissible), but this does not preclude the possibility that we ben-
eﬁt individuals by bringing them into a happy existence. Similarly (but with
the exception of Singer 1972), we do not generally consider it blameworthy to
refrain from donating a large portion of our income to poverty alleviation efforts
but have no problem praising those who do. On most liberal accounts of morality,
charity is supererogatory, and my intuitions suggest the same is true of making
happy people. Roberts and others are free to disagree, but I here take axiological
possibilism as an assumption of my argument.6
3. Possibilist Contractarianism
In order to consider the interests of possible persons in collective decision-making
contexts, I use a version of hypothetical contractarianism. This approach is most
closely associated with Rawls (1971), but my argument owes more to Harsanyi
(1953; 1955; 1977; 1978). The contractarian method simulates disinterested
moral reﬂection by asking what principles, institutions, or rules rational and
self-interested individuals would choose when denied knowledge of their place
in society. To borrow a couple of Rawlsian terms, the ‘original position’ con-
sists of some population of contractors behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ which denies
them knowledge of their own place in society. The population of contractors,
the nature of the veil, and the decision rules used by contractors vary between
contractarian theories. In terms of the nature of the veil and the decision rule
adopted, I follow Harsanyi. Contractors are perfectly informed about the pref-
erences of all members of society and how the relevant alternatives will impact
resource allocations. At the same time they are denied knowledge of their place
in society. Each contractor has an equal chance of taking the place of any mem-
ber of the relevant population, with their combination of resource allocations
and preferences determined by random chance. In thinking about the choice
between alternative rules, then, the contractor approaches the choice as one be-
tween quantiﬁably uncertain prospects. In asking which alternative maximizes
expected utility, the contractor is forced to consider the interests of all affected
parties impartially. The uncertainty of this original position forces its hypothet-
6 Though I may well be outnumbered on intuitions regarding the praiseworthiness of making happy
people, I am far from alone (see e.g. C. Hare 2007; R. M. Hare 1975; Holtug 2001; Nagel 1970, 78;
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ical inhabitants to abandon their idiosyncratic preferences and to impartially
balance the competing interests of all relevant parties, since each could end up
being any of these parties.
While accepting Harsanyi’s version of the veil of ignorance and the decision
rule motivating contractors, I depart from his deﬁnition of the relevant popu-
lation and instead follow Kavka (1975, 240), who points out that the standard
veil of ignorance fails to obscure one potentially very important fact: that one
exists. Since each individual in the original position knows that they will in fact
exist, their choices may not be as impartial as we might like. Parﬁt provides an
example of a contractor choosing between two possible worlds:
“In Hell One, the last generation consists of ten innocent people, who
each suffer great agony for ﬁfty years. The lives of these people are
much worse than nothing. They would all kill themselves if they
could. In Hell Two, the last generation consists not of ten but of ten
million innocent people, who each suffer agony just as great for ﬁfty
years minus a day.” (Parﬁt 1984, 393)
If given the knowledge that they will certainly exist, a selﬁshly rational individ-
ual will prefer Hell Two, since it saves them from a day of agony. Intuitively,
though, Hell Two looks much worse than Hell One. The standard hypothetical
contractarian method completely ignores the number of those suffering, which
is surely a morally relevant fact. The natural response to such problems is to
populate the original position with possible rather than actual persons. Each
possible person is asked to evaluate the rules of a society which they will live
in if they happen to come into existence at all. Rules affect the number of indi-
viduals in society as well as the welfare of those who are actually born, and the
hypothetical contractarian approach I adopt here provides the conditions for an
impartial consideration of both factors.
The use of hypothetical contractarianism is motivated by the need to impar-
tially consider the interests of all affected parties and reﬂects the general dis-
tinction made by constitutional political economists between choice among rules
and choice within rules (Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Hamlin 2014). When
it comes to in-period political choice, deliberation and voting on particular chil-
dren’s rights laws would be biased by each individual’s idiosyncratic preferences
and position. The constitutionalist’s response to this problem is to push debate
up a level of generality and seek agreement on the rules by which children’s
rights laws can be enacted. If the rules under consideration are sufﬁciently gen-
eral and durable, individuals will be forced by a ‘veil of uncertainty’ to consider
the matter impartially, since any unfairness cannot reasonably be predicted to
be to one’s advantage in the long run. Here, though, the certainty that one has
been born (and if we restrict suffrage to adults, that one has reached adulthood)
renders the impartiality of constitutional deliberation questionable. No matter
the generality and durability of constitutional rules, the actual will always be
able to stack the deck in favor of themselves and against the possible. Hypothet-
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the interests of current and future generations if we include all those who exist
today and all those who will ever exist. When the existence of some individ-
uals is endogenous to the choice at hand, however, the affected parties whose
interests we should consider include those who might never come to exist.
To make use of the original position as an analytic device in this context, we
need to deﬁne the relevant population of possible persons. If we are considering
the choice between two rules q and r, the possible persons we should consider
are those existing in either or both of the two possible worlds (wq and wr respec-
tively) realized by our choice. Let Q equal the set of individuals existing in wq
and R the set of individuals existing in wr. The relevant set of possible persons
will be the union of these two sets. The original position will thus be populated
by |N| = |Q [ R| individuals uncertain of their identity. Each contractor seeks
to maximize their personal utility, which depends both on their probability of
being actualized and on their utility contingent upon actualization. Let Ex rep-
resent the expected utility of an individual contingent on existing in world wx.
Since we are assuming that non-existence has a utility of zero, each contrac-
tor will prefer whichever rule x maximizes Ex(|X|/|N|). Other things equal,
contractors prefer rules which give them a greater probability of existing and
greater utility in the event that they do exist. When these two factors conﬂict,
contractors need to weigh a greater chance of being actualized against a lower
expected utility contingent upon actualization.
Some have denied that hypothetical contractarianism can meaningfully be
modiﬁed in this way. Parﬁt states that ‘we cannot assume that, in the actual
history of the world, it might be true that we never exist. We therefore cannot
ask what, on this assumption, it would be rational to choose’ (Parﬁt 1984, 392).
This, he says, means that the contractual method ‘is not impartial unless we
imagine something that we cannot possibly imagine’. It is unclear why Parﬁt
thinks we cannot ponder the uncertainty of our own existence. Is it just that our
own non-existence is hard to imagine? True, but we do not need a very thick de-
scription to do moral philosophy. Kavka’s paper imagines a hypothetical choice,
and the existence of such a paper seems to show that at least one human has
sufﬁcient imaginative power. Parﬁt might instead mean that we as actual peo-
ple know that the status quo set of institutions has produced a world in which
we exist. Our existence supervenes on the actual history of the world, and so
we have some information that existing institutions are good for us, and this
adulterates the neutrality of our moral reasoning. This may be true, but it ap-
plies more broadly and does not preclude the possibility of at least attempting to
abstract from this bias in order to impartially evaluate principles, institutions,
or rules.
Cowen offers a more substantive criticism, arguing that since hypothetical
contractarianism assumes that those in the original position are self-interested,
too much weight is given to actualizing possible persons. To illustrate his ob-
jection, Cowen (1989, 39–40) uses the example of ‘Hurka’s Gamble’.7 We are
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to imagine that some omnipotent being offers us a gamble. With probability
0.51 the current and future population doubles with the average level of utility
remaining the same; with probability 0.49 the human race is extinguished. In
a world of 100 people each enjoying a payoff of 10, the relevant population of
potential persons is 200. Rejecting the gamble would maintain the status quo,
giving each potential person a 0.5 probability of earning a payoff of 10 and a 0.5
probability of not existing and earning a payoff of 0. Accepting the Gamble would
yield a 0.51 probability of existing (payoff 10) and a 0.49 probability of not exist-
ing (payoff 0). Accepting the gamble gives a higher expected payoff (5.1 versus
5), is less risky, and does not alter the payoff contingent on existence. As such, it
is clearly optimal to accept the gamble. Further, it will be rational to accept the
gamble however many times it is offered. As the number of completed gambles
increases, the probability of the human race surviving approaches zero. Hypo-
thetical contractarianism with possible persons should be rejected, according to
Cowen, since by giving each potential life equal weight and accepting Hurka’s
gamble it “does not [capture] the notion that increasing numbers of individuals
do not always yield a proportionately better solution” (Cowen 1989, 40).
To answer Cowen’s criticism, we need to ask what ‘self-interested’ means in
the context of contractarianism. Each potential individual is interested in max-
imizing the utility they can expect to enjoy, but this does not imply selﬁshness
in the sense of indifference to the welfare of others or to other considerations.
If individuals have a preference that the human race exists in some form or
that as many individuals as possible exist independently of their preference for
their own existence, the payoffs involved in Hurka’s Gamble alter. This would
involve a departure from selﬁshness, but not from self-interest in the sense of
optimizing on one’s own preference function. No hypothetical contractor knows
their place in society, but if the individuals they have a chance of becoming have
altruistic or non-instrumental preferences, this is a relevant consideration from
a self-interested point of view. Suppose that each potential individual has a
preference of intensity 1 that the human race exists.8 Since we are engaged
in a comparative exercise, the preferences of potential individuals are relevant
whether or not those individuals are actualized. Thus, in a the no-gamble situa-
tion, each contractor has a 0.5 probability of existing and having the human race
existing (payoff 11) and a 0.5 probability of not existing but having the human
race remain (payoff 1). The Gamble involves a .51 probability of existing and
having the human race existing (payoff 11) and a .49 probability of not existing
and having the human race end (payoff 0). The choice is no longer so clear. With
payoffs as arbitrarily deﬁned here, rejecting the gamble yields a higher expected
payoff with lower variance and would therefore be preferred by most reasonable
decision rules. The contractarian method is designed to remove bias by focusing
on the preferences which individuals actually have. If people are self-interested
8 That is, any person who comes to exist in any world will have this preference. In the present
case, this means that each of the 100 inhabitants of the no-gamble world receive a payoff of 1
from knowing of the existence of the human race. If the gamble is taken and won, each of the 200
inhabitants will have a similar preference.104 Brad R. Taylor
in a narrow sense, contractarianism will produce conclusions many of us con-
sider undesirable.
As Hurka’s Gamble shows, the results of hypothetical contractarianism are
vulnerable to misspeciﬁed preferences. If we make the wrong assumptions about
what individuals would choose under ideal circumstances, we will get the wrong
answer. This is true of contractarianism generally, and indeed all normative
approaches which take preferences or interests as evaluative standards. Like
formal modeling in the social sciences, the contractarian method in normative
political theory does not guarantee reasonable assumptions, but it does make
assumptions transparent. In addition to making assumptions more easily evalu-
able, this enables a form of sensitivity analysis as assumptions can be altered
and the robustness of conclusions across alternative speciﬁcations observed.
4. Children’s Rights and Parents’ Incentives
Parents care deeply about the type of lives their children will live. Although
most parents surely have a good deal of disinterested altruistic concern for their
children—they simply want them to live a life as valuable as possible—parents
also derive utility from their children in ways which are not in the child’s best
interests. This is particularly true of the cases children’s rights laws are de-
signed to deal with. The fact that many parents are willing to deny their chil-
dren medical treatment or education despite strong opposition from mainstream
society suggests that their cultural preferences are strong and deeply-held. In
many cases, the welfare of children and the preferences of parents seem to be at
odds. If, as many liberals hold, Christian scientists have mistaken theological
views and harm their children by denying them life-saving medical treatment,
we have a prima facie case for a liberal state to step in to protect children, at
least on certain interpretations of liberalism.9
Such cases can be usefully considered in light of the economic approach to
fertility developed by Gary Becker (1960; 1991).10 In this rational choice frame-
work, parents are assumed to maximize some preference function, which is pos-
itively related to services produced by the child as well as other forms of con-
sumption. A child is both consumption good and production good as far as par-
ents are concerned. In their capacity as consumption goods, children produce
enjoyment, pride, or are otherwise directly valued by their parents. In their ca-
pacity as production goods, children contribute to the production of other goods
by working within the household or on the labor market. We need not assume
here that parents are selﬁsh, but that they maximize a utility function which
does not perfectly reﬂect the best interests of the child. In some cases such con-
9 On interpretations of liberalism which would not make such an assumption, see generally Galston
(1995), Kukathas (2003), and Levy (2003).
10 See also Birdsall (1988, 501–522) and Hotz et al. (1997).Children’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility 105
ﬂict will be due to selﬁshness; in others, to misguided altruism or commitment
to some impersonal moral creed.
The unusual relationship between parent and child raises special problems
for liberal theory. The parent not only has unparalleled power to harm or beneﬁt
the child, but also controls the very existence of the child. Access to birth con-
trol, abortion, and reproductive technologies have dramatically increased the
control of fertility in the developed world today, but fertility has always been
controllable to some extent through methods such as abstinence, coitus inter-
ruptus, and extended breast-feeding. Fertility choices are inﬂuenced by all sorts
of factors (Hondroyiannis 2010, 34–35). Among these factors, I will argue, is
the extent to which parents can shape the development of their children in line
with their own preferences. If institutional factors inﬂuence the very existence
of some children, the liberal or utilitarian justiﬁcations for children’s rights laws
become much more complicated.
Raising children is costly, and parents respond to incentives when making
fertility decisions. Factors such as income, opportunity cost, and ﬁscal policy
will inﬂuence the number of children people choose to have. So too will the
expected ‘quality’ of children deﬁned in terms of the degree to which the child
produces tangible and intangible services valued by parents. Children’s rights
laws which restrict parental sovereignty, if they are to alter the behavior of tar-
geted parents and ruling out strict indifference, necessarily reduce the quality of
children in this sense. Under a rational choice framework, the fact that parents
are choosing to treat their children in certain ways reveals that they prefer the
state of affairs in which they so treat their children. By passing laws which pre-
vent such treatment, we tighten their budget constraint and lower their welfare.
More importantly, we change the relative price of child services. Assuming that
the costs of raising children remain the same, children’s rights laws will make it
more expensive to produce a unit of child service.
If we assume continuous demand for children, and barring the possibility
that child services are Giffen goods, this will straightforwardly reduce the quan-
tity of child services demanded, as shown in ﬁgure 1. The vertical axis repre-
sents the quantity of child services C, and the horizontal axis represents the
quantity of all other goods, X. The budget constraint BC1 shows the possible
combinations of child services and other goods the parent could produce given
the resources they have available in a world without child protection laws. Given
the parents’ preferences as represented by the indifference curves I1 and I2, the
parent will demand child services in quantity Q1. With the introduction of a
children’s rights law, the production function which transforms child-rearing in-
puts into child services becomes less technologically efﬁcient, and this increases
the price of children, thus pushing the budget constraint inwards to BC2 and
increasing the relative price of child services, as reﬂected in the altered slope of
the budget constraint. This will reduce the quantity of child services demanded
from Q1 to Q2.106 Brad R. Taylor
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A recognition of the fact that child services are not entirely continuous—that is,
the parent is not able to produce at any point value but is rather constrained to a
set of discrete options—complicates the analysis somewhat and means that chil-
dren’s rights laws would probabilistically reduce the quantity of child services
demanded. Given sufﬁciently many parents with varying budget constraints
and indifference curves, however, the discrete case would approximate the con-
tinuous case described above.
Of course, child services are not the same thing as children. Economic theo-
rists of fertility have long recognized that there is a trade-off between the quan-
tity and quality of children (Becker and Lewis 1973). That is, a parent may have
many children and derive a little satisfaction from each or may invest heavily
in one or two children in order to derive greater per-child satisfaction. Fertility
decline in the developed world seems to reﬂect a shift from quantity to quality in
this sense. Thus, it is possible for the situation in ﬁgure 1 to be realized without
a decrease in the number of children born. Rather, the parent invests less in
each child. This is likely true for some parents and some types of legal protec-
tions, but it seems a priori likely that in some cases a reduction in the demand
for child services will be accompanied by a reduction in the number of children
produced. Indeed, there are some empirical cases where legal restrictions do
seem to have had an effect on fertility.
One such case is the prohibition of child labor. Child labor is not necessarily
bad for children, since some households are so poor that child labor is necessary
for survival. Under such conditions, even purely altruistic parents would send
their children to work and restrictions on their ability to do so would be badChildren’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility 107
for children (Basu and Van 1998). The analysis here is concerned with cases in
which there is a genuine conﬂict of interest—i.e. the child would be better off not
working. Formal theoretic models have generally concluded that restrictions on
child labor will tend to reduce fertility (Dessy 2000; Doepke 2004). While there
has been little rigorous empirical investigation of this question, that evidence
which does exist supports this conclusion. This evidence is indirect in the sense
that it suggests that child labor market conditions which alter the economic
value of children to parents, rather than regulation per se, have an effect on
fertility. It should be obvious that certain labor-market restrictions will reduce
the economic value to parents of children. If we can know empirically that lower
value tends to depress fertility, it is reasonable to conclude that certain types of
regulation will reduce fertility. Early studies showed that child participation in
the labor market tend to coincide with high birth rates (Schultz 1970). This tells
us very little, however, since high birth rates could easily be causally responsi-
ble for high rates of child labor. Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) show that high
child wage rates in India are correlated with high levels of fertility and take this
as evidence that parents respond to economic opportunities by having more chil-
dren. Levy (1985) ﬁnds similar evidence in Egypt. While correlational studies
of this sort can never rule out omitted variable bias, there is no obvious alterna-
tive explanation. If a law is implemented which prevents parents from sending
their children to work, fertility will be affected, at least in a probabilistic sense.
Children in poor countries are a productive asset for households, and anything
which reduces their productivity will increase the relative price of child services
and potentially reduce fertility.
Another case is the prohibition of gamete donor anonymity. A number of
theorists have argued that children have a right to knowledge of their genetic
heritage and that the anonymous donation of sperm or ova violates this right
(Frith 2001; Cowden 2012). Without knowledge of who their biological parents
are, it is argued, children are unable to form a coherent sense of identity. If we
accept this argument and given that many donors wish to remain anonymous,
prohibition of anonymous donation is a protection of children against the prefer-
ence of their donor parents.11 Such prohibitions harm some donors and beneﬁt
some children in a justiﬁable way. In recent years, many countries have used
this logic to justify prohibitions of anonymous donation (Turkmendag, Dingwall
and Murphy 2008, 283–284). It has been pointed out that prohibition might re-
duce donation rates, since prospective donors might worry about being identiﬁed
and contacted by donor-conceived offspring. Since there is already a perceived
shortage of suitable gamete donors, prohibiting anonymous donation makes it
more difﬁcult for recipient parents to have children (Pennings 2001). This is
normally framed as a normative problem insofar as it is bad for potential recip-
ient parents, but under the framework I am adopting here we can also see it as
affecting potential children by making their realization less likely.
11 Things get more complicated when we consider the interests of the social parents. I ignore these
complications here since they do not affect the general thrust of the example.108 Brad R. Taylor
In UK survey research, the potential for identiﬁcation by and contact from
offspring were the most-cited concerns among semen donors. Forty-six percent
stated concern that law changes would allow offspring to identify them once they
reached adulthood, and thirty-seven percent expressed concern about being con-
tacted by offspring. These reasons were also highly cited by non-donors, though
they were not so dominant. Sixty-eight percent of donors stated that they would
not be willing to donate if the law changed to allow their name to be revealed
to offspring once they reached eighteen years of age (Cook and Golombok 1995).
Other studies have shown more modest effects, but all existing survey research
suggests that a signiﬁcant proportion of donors would rather not donate in the
absence of anonymity.12
Survey research has its limitations when used to predict behavior, of course,
but other forms of empirical evidence seem to point in the same direction. Politi-
cal debates and eventual law changes prohibiting anonymous semen donation in
the UK and the Netherlands have coincided with sharp reductions in donation
rates (Janssens et al. 2006; Paul, Harbottle and Stewart 2006). More convinc-
ingly, many prospective parents are willing to travel internationally in order to
undergo assisted reproduction in jurisdictions without donor anonymity prohi-
bitions (Pennings 2010). As the Dutch law came into effect, for example, clinics
in Belgium, and particularly those near the Dutch border, saw a large increase
in Dutch patients (Ombelet 2007; Pennings et al. 2009).
These two cases are suggestive that laws designed to protect children from
bad parents can sometimes reduce the number of children born. Theoretically,
we should expect this effect to apply more broadly. Laws designed to protect
children from their parents lower the value of children to their parents, and the
economic analysis of fertility outlined above suggests that this will sometimes
prompt prospective parents not to have otherwise desired children. In many
cases the effect will be minor, but in some it could be quite signiﬁcant. The
purpose of this paper is not to show that any particular piece of children’s rights
legislation is undesirable due to its antinatalist effects, but to show theoretically
that there is normatively-relevant issue which needs to be considered across a
range of cases.
One argument in the utility function of many parents will be the cultural
development of the child in particular directions. Other things equal, limits
on parental sovereignty will shift the parent’s cost-beneﬁt analysis away from
having a child. While this effect will surely be inframarginal for most fertility
decisions, it will just as surely tip the analysis in some cases and reduce the
number of children born to illiberal parents.
The lives of children subject to illiberal practices, we shall suppose, are worse
than they would have been could they have avoided those practices. If we also
think those lives would have been worth living, however, we face a normative
trade-off between more and better lives. I am here interested in the set of rules
which are best for the relevant population of children, and so ignore the wel-
12 See Pennings (2001, 617–618) for a brief review of the survey literature. On Oocyte donation, see
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fare of parents and any positive or negative externalities population imposes on
third parties. The next section, in order to evaluate this trade-off, adopts the
contractarian framework outlined in section 3.
5. Children’s Rights in the Original Position
Before considering the trade-off between more and better lives, it will be useful
to consider a baseline model in which a child, knowing she will actually exist,
chooses whether to enact children’s rights legislation. This is the situation chil-
dren’s rights advocates implicitly assume when they ignore the indirect effects
of legislation on fertility.
Imagine a rational, self-interested child deciding at birth whether to allow
parents to perform some action which will reduce the child’s lifetime utility. This
situation is represented in ﬁgure 2 as an extensive form game between two play-
ers, Child and Parent. Assume that a>b with certainty and that y>x with some
probability p(0<p<1).
The hypothetical child chooses whether to implement a law to protect chil-
dren’s rights (L) or not (¬L). If Child chooses ¬L, Parent chooses whether to
restrict the autonomy of the child (R) or not (¬R). A choice of ¬R gives the same
payoffs as the situation in which Child chooses L, but R gives Child payoff b and
parent payoff y. Choosing L gives Child a with certainty; choosing ¬L gives a
with probability (1-p) and b with probability p. Since a>b, the utility-maximizing
move for Child is L. We can conclude that in such situations children’s rights
laws are good for children.13
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The hypothetical child needs also to consider the effect of institutions on Par-
ent’s willingness to have children. After the child has chosen whether or not to
legislate Parent chooses whether to have a child (C) or not (¬C). If Child chooses
to legislate at stage one, Parent has control over their fertility but not the de-
cision of whether to restrict. For ¬L, Parent chooses whether to have a child
and restrict (R), have a child and not restrict (¬R), or not have a child (¬C). Par-
ent heterogeneity is important here. My suggestion is that some parents will
choose to have children if and only if there is no law restricting parental auton-
omy. That is, for some parent i: ui(¬L, C)> ui(¬L, ¬C)^ui(L,C)< ui(L, ¬C), where
ui(X,Y) represents the payoff to i of the solution (X,Y).
If we place no restrictions on parental preferences, there are six possible
parental types (deﬁned in terms of strategies), labelled s1 – s6 in table 1 below.
Though each of these strategies is logically possible, it is difﬁcult to plausibly
rationalize the preference orderings behind strategies s5 and s6 unless the law
inﬂuences their behavior indirectly rather than by directly deﬁning their choice
set. Since these strategies are rather implausible and my purpose here is to
demonstrate a possibility, I exclude these strategies from the analysis for the
sake of simplicity and consider only s1 – s4.14
L ¬L
s1 (Weakly illiberal) C (C,R)
s2 (Strongly illiberal) ¬C (C,R)
s3 (Liberal) C (C,¬R)
s4 (Non-breeder) ¬C ¬C
s5 (Excluded) C ¬C
s6 (Excluded) ¬C (C,¬R)
Table 1: Parental types
Children’s rights law is designed to change the behavior of the weakly illiberal
(s1) and strongly illiberal (s2) parents, and indeed the behavior of these types is
changed by introduction of a law: the weakly illiberal have children but do not
14 A possible rationalization for s5 is that parents prefer not to bring children into a society with
illiberal practices or because they worry about dying before the child is raised and having their
new guardian restrict their autonomy. A possible rationalization for s6 is that the parent wishes
to raise an autonomous child but objects to the state limiting parental sovereignty, either on
symbolic grounds or because they worry about a ‘slippery slope’ to more extensive limitations of
parental sovereignty. Although these strategies are coherent, such attitudes seem sufﬁciently
unlikely that we can ignore them for the purposes of this paper. Considering such groups would
add to complexity of the analysis below but would only alter its result is this group is sufﬁciently
large relative to strongly illiberal parents (for an earlier version of this argument which considers
s5 parents, see Taylor (2014, chap. 5). I here make no substantive argument that this will not be
the case, and thus this possibility puts another condition on the applicability of my argument.Children’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility 111
restrict their autonomy and the strongly illiberal choose not to have children
at all. The choices of liberal and non-breeding parents are not affected by the
law, with liberals always having children and giving them autonomy and non-
breeders never having children. With respect to the choice between L and ¬L,
the children of liberal (s3) and weakly illiberal (s1) parents are necessary per-
sons, the children of non-breeders (s4) are impossible persons, and the children
of strongly illiberal (s2) parents are contingent persons. Contingent persons are
clearly affected by the choice between L and ¬L, and so too are the children
of weakly illiberal parents. Though they are necessary persons, their welfare
varies across alternatives. The groups affected by the decision at hand are the
children of strongly illiberal and weakly illiberal meaning that we can ignore
the other groups.
Our original position, then, will be populated by possible children with the
knowledge that their parents are of type s1 or s2 but unsure which of these types
and judge probability on the relative number of these types in society. We can
arbitrarily set the utility value of non-existence for Child at 0, and continue to
assume a>b>0 (i.e. that an autonomous life is better than a nonautonomous life
is better than nonexistence).15
Similarly, we can arbitrarily set Parent’s utility from not having a child at
0.16 All illiberal parents (s1 or s2) most prefer to have a child and restrict their
autonomy (payoff y). Weakly illiberal parents prefer an autonomous child (x)
to none at all (0), while strongly illiberal parents have the opposite preference.
Thus, for weakly illiberal parents, y>x>0, while for strongly illiberal parents
y>0>x. This situation is represented in ﬁgure 3 below (child’s payoff is ﬁrst).
15 Some types of non-autonomous existence may be worse than not existing, in which case Child’s
preference ordering would be a>0>b. When discussing the right of parents to severely abuse
their children such an ordering might be relevant and would remove the trade-off between more
and better lives (since marginal lives would have negative value). In most cases where chil-
dren’s rights laws are up for debate, however, a non-autonomous existence is on average better
than nothing. Few would deny that women generally live worthwhile lives despite clitoridectomy,
though they might be signiﬁcantly less worthwhile than they otherwise would have been. In
this paper I am concerned with laws for which the proscribed activity would reduce the victim’s
welfare but not by so much that their life is not worth living. An interesting extension of my
argument would be to consider cases in which mild restriction reduced welfare but did not re-
verse the ranking of life and non-existence while extreme restrictions did make life worse than
nothing. If some parents would engage in extreme restrictions and others mild restrictions and if
a law could prohibit extreme restriction only by also prohibiting mild restriction, we would have
another trade-off to consider. s1 and s2 could each be divided into two types, those who would
engage in mild and extreme restriction respectively. This would increase the desirability of legis-
lation, and the strength of this effect would depend on relative number of extremely and mildly
restrictive parents. Since I think the politically relevant case overwhelmingly involve cases in
which restriction almost always leaves the child with a life worth living I do not incorporate this
possibility into the analysis.
16 It should be noted that both zero-points are arbitrary and that we cannot compare the utility of
Parent and Child.112 Brad R. Taylor
18 
 
Figure 3: Children's right with endogenous fertility 
 
 
 
When Child chooses L, Parent chooses between C and ¬C. If the parent is weakly illiberal 
they choose C for payoff x, since x>0. If strongly illiberal, they choose ¬C for payoff 0, 
since 0>x. When Child chooses ¬L, Parent chooses between R and ¬C. Since y>x and 
y>0 for all relevant parents, all choose R for payoff y. Thus, ¬L gives Child payoff b with 
certainty and L gives a or 0 with some probability determined by the relative number of 
strongly and weakly illiberal parents in the population.  
Let |S1| and |S2| represent respectively the cardinality of the sets of weakly and strongly 
illiberal parents. These sets are disjoint and together exhaust the set N of relevant parents 
(i.e. |S1| + |S2| = |S1 ∪	S2| = |N|). From Child’s perspective behind the veil of ignorance, 
then, the probability p of Parent being of type s1 is given by p=|S1|/ |N|. Choosing L gives 
Child a (autonomous life) with p and 0 (nonexistence) with 1-p. Choosing ¬L gives b 
with certainty. The decision facing Child is shown in figure 4 below.  
Figure 3: Children’s right with endogenous fertility
When Child chooses L, Parent chooses between C and ¬C. If the parent is weakly
illiberal they choose C for payoff x, since x>0. If strongly illiberal, they choose
¬C for payoff 0, since 0>x. When Child chooses ¬L, Parent chooses between R,
¬R and ¬C. Since y>x and y>0 for all relevant parents, all choose R for payoff
y. Thus, ¬L gives Child payoff b with certainty and L gives a or 0 with some
probability determined by the relative number of strongly and weakly illiberal
parents in the population.
Let |S1| and |S2| represent respectively the cardinality of the sets of weakly
and strongly illiberal parents. These sets are disjoint and together exhaust the
set N of relevant parents (i.e. |S1| + |S2| = |S1 [ S2| = |N|). From Child’s
perspective behind the veil of ignorance, then, the probability p of Parent being
of type s1 is given by p=|S1| / |N|. Choosing L gives Child a (autonomous life)
with p and 0 (nonexistence) with 1-p. Choosing ¬L gives b with certainty. The
decision facing Child is shown in ﬁgure 4 below.
What would a rational person choose in thus original position? Child, as
an expected utility maximizer, will choose L if pa > b and ¬L if pa < b. The
choice between L and ¬L depends on two factors. Firstly, a strong preference for
existence and relative indifference between types of existence makes a regime
of parental sovereignty more attractive. If a-b is small relative to b-0, the low
marginal beneﬁt of autonomy will make a choice of ¬L more likely. Secondly, and
more interestingly, the magnitude of |S1| in relation to |S2| is important. In-
tuitively it seems that extremely illiberal parents would make legislation more
desirable. The analysis here suggests that the existence of parents so strongly
illiberal that they would rather not have children if forced to raise them liber-
ally is reason to oppose children’s rights legislation. Children of s1 parents are
better off under L, and children of s2 parents are better off under ¬L. A greater
proportion of s2 parents will decrease p and thereby make ¬L more attractive.Children’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility 113
We should not push this point too far, however, since the strength of illiberalism
varies on many directions. Among the most important of these is presumably
the severity of restrictions imposed on children, and in this respect more intense
illiberalism would indeed provide reason to legislate.
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Figure 4: A decision-theoretic simpliﬁcation
The potential child faces a trade-off between the probability of being born and
their payoff conditional on being born. It should be noted that L is Pareto supe-
rior to ¬L when we consider only actual children under L, but since the number
of children born will be greater under ¬L a rational possible child behind the veil
of ignorance might oppose L in full knowledge that such a policy would beneﬁt
some and harm no actual children—that their choice will allow parents to abuse
their authority in ways which make their life signiﬁcantly worse.
The analysis given here is abstract and as such does not provide direct an-
swers to real world policy debates over parental sovereignty and children’s rights.
Firm normative conclusions in such cases would require the speciﬁcation of
many things which cannot in practice be speciﬁed, including the relative value
of an autonomous and nonautonomous existence, risk preference independent of
identity, and the causal effect of legislation of fertility. What we can do, based on
the assumptions I have made in this paper, is conclude that there is a potentially
normatively-relevant issue which has so far been ignored in these debates. It
may be that children’s rights legislation remains desirable all-things-considered,
but this should not be assumed too lightly if we place normative weight on those
‘voices from another world’ (C. Hare 2007) whose existence some otherwise de-
sirable policies might thwart.114 Brad R. Taylor
6. Conclusion
Even if we restrict moral standing to children, there are important trade-offs
when considering the desirability of legislation designed to protect children from
their parents. Parents have great control over the welfare and development
of their children, and when interests diverge there seems to be a prima facie
case for state intervention. At the same time, parent’s ultimate control over
the very existence of children provides reason for caution. If the contractarian
method adopted here is accepted as a way of simulating impartial evaluation of
competing interests, laws which are good for some actual children and bad for
none might still be considered harmful for children generally in an abstract but
important sense.
The situation here is an instance of a broader phenomenon familiar to po-
litical economists. Many policies have unintended consequences which are pre-
dictable but impossible to specify or observe empirically. Frédéric Bastiat (1995)
distinguished between the seen and the unseen effects of policies, arguing that
the task of the economist is to look beyond the immediate and visible effects
of a policy and consider the invisible but analytically foreseeable consequences.
Those children protected from parental mistreatment are visible and (imper-
fectly) speciﬁable. Those children never born as a result of regulation are in-
visible and nonspeciﬁc. This paper has argued that such invisibility should not
diminish their moral standing. More generally, we should subject normative
theory to positive analysis in order to uncover the unseen effects of proposals
which seem clearly desirable at ﬁrst glance. Such analysis is an indispensable
component of any normative theorizing which seeks to inform real-world choices
(Brennan and Hamlin 2009).
Rules never tell people precisely how to behave. Rather, rules cut off certain
options but leave others open. If rules are made in the hope of preventing one
type of harmful action but leave more harmful alternatives on the table, desir-
ability is far from assured. The situation here is somewhat analogous to that
of minimum wage laws in terms of logical structure. While these laws are in-
tended to protect vulnerable workers from unfair treatment by employers, they
do not mandate that vulnerable workers are hired and receive decent wages.
Rather, they mandate reasonable wages conditional on employment, and this
will prompt employers to hire fewer low-productivity (i.e. vulnerable) workers.
Minimum wage laws will increase the wages of some relatively vulnerable work-
ers but will tend to push the most vulnerable out of work altogether (Gorman
2002). Just as the existence of many highly vulnerable workers on low wages
shows us that there is a problem but also indicates that the most obvious policy
solution might do more harm than good, the existence of many parents strongly
committed to raising their children in ways which hamper the development of
autonomy does not necessarily provide an argument for prohibition on welfarist
grounds.
This is not to say that such abuses of parental authority should be ignored,
however. While rational possible children may prefer a regime of parental sover-Children’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility 115
eignty to one characterized by broad negative sanctions, there may be other in-
centive schemes which encourage liberal treatment without depressing fertility.
Interestingly, imperfect enforcement of children’s rights laws could be beneﬁ-
cial here. I have assumed above that legislation is absolutely binding. If we
relax this assumption and admit that some people will break the law and accept
punishment with some probability, we can see a legal prohibition as imposing
an additional cost on undesirable actions. Those with a weak preference for
the prohibited activity will be unwilling to pay this cost, while those with very
strong preferences will. Thus, imperfectly enforced prohibitions might encour-
age liberal treatment while allowing the strongly illiberal to have children and
(unlawfully) raise them in accordance with their preferences. This would not
completely resolve the trade-off between rights protection and fertility, since the
cost of breaking the law will be a decisive factor in some fertility choices. It
may be the case, however, that weakly enforced laws with various loopholes are
preferable to stronger laws in some cases.
Moreover, laws interact with preferences and norms in various ways (Cooter
1998; Sunstein 1996). An obvious possibility arises when we consider the model
above dynamically, with today’s children becoming tomorrow’s parents. If paren-
tal type is heritable via upbringing, the distribution of parental types will be
endogenous to the choice between L and ¬L in previous periods. Children’s
rights protections would put the strongly illiberal at a reproductive disadvan-
tage. Though the normative position adopted here would see these missing gen-
erations as regrettable, it is plausible that under some conditions other groups
would increase their fertility to compensate. If that were the case the normative
analysis would need to be much more complicated than that presented above.
Another possibility is that the preferences of particular parents are endoge-
nous to institutions. This could happen directly via a psychological reaction to
policy. Parents might respond to legislation by internalizing the liberal norms
embodied therein. On the other hand, unpopular laws might provoke backlash
from parents and reinforcement of illiberal attitudes. Social factors suggest that
law might affect preferences indirectly. It may be, as Mackie (1996) argues,
that certain cultural practices such as female genital mutilation are instead the
result of a suboptimal cultural norm which parents prefer to follow only when
such norms are widespread, suggesting that legislation might facilitate escape
from a suboptimal equilibrium. These issues need to be weighed up on a case-
by-case basis. In some cases the protective beneﬁts of children’s rights laws
will outweigh the costs. In others, the apparent trade-off may be illusory in the
long term. The argument presented here, however, shows that the existence
of vulnerable children and bad parents does not necessarily justify protective
intervention.116 Brad R. Taylor
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